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Abstract
Governments the world over routinely undertake Land Value Capture (LVC) to recover some 
(or all) of the uplift in land values arising from the right to develop in order to fund 
infrastructure and public goods. Instruments to exact LVC are diverse but are usually 
implemented independently. However, since 2011 England has been experimenting with a 
dual approach to LVC, applying both a tariff style levy to fund local infrastructure (the 
Community Infrastructure Levy) and negotiated obligations, used primarily to fund 
affordable housing (section 106 agreements). In this article we employ a difference-in-
differences (DID) method to identify the interaction of these two instruments available to 
local planning authorities. We explore the question of whether the Community Infrastructure 
Levy ‘crowds out’ affordable housing secured through section 106 planning agreements. In 
so doing we show that the interaction of these two approaches is heterogenous across local 
authorities of different types. This raises questions for understanding the economic geography 
of development activity and the theory and practice of Land Value Capture.
Keywords: Built Environment, Development, Economic Processes, Housing, Land Use
Introduction
Inflation in residential real estate prices has become a hallmark of urban life for many citizens 
the world over. A large body of academic work now serves to describe the specific economic 
determinants and social implications of house price inflation in a vast array of contexts (see, 
for indicative examples, Acolin and Green, 217; Bangura and Lee, 2019; Li et al., 2020; Zhang, 
Jia and Yang, 2016).  Describing the universality of this public policy problem Wetzstein 
(2017) refers to the “global urban housing affordability crisis”.  However, formulating a policy 
response that results in the delivery of sufficient affordable housing has proven to be a 
seemingly intractable problem for policy makers. 
In many contexts the question of how more affordable housing should be secured has been 
elided with the broader issue of ‘Land Value Capture’ (LVC).  This is the process by which 
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either/both cash payments or/and in-kind contributions are made by the development industry 
and delivered in parallel to a specific development .  These contributions should, in theory, 
reflect the uplift in land values associated with the award of planning consent.  This state-
market interaction is a common feature of polities the world over and, although the economic 
mechanism differs from context to context, the underlying principle remains the same: for a 
private developer to deliver new housing at market rates there will often be a statutory 
requirement for this profit-orientated activity to be accompanied with social, environmental 
and economic public goods. How these public goods should be secured, what proportion of the 
uplift in land values could/should be recovered by the state and which specific public goods 
should be made a condition of new development are all facets of what has come to be known 
internationally as the question of Land Value Capture (LVC).
As housing affordability has declined and become an increasingly pressing social and 
economic issue in many advanced economies LVC has become a popular way of financing 
affordable housing.  For example, in 2020 £4.7bn of the total £7bn that was raised through 
LVC in England represented the delivery of affordable housing by private developers as a result 
of the imposition of a quota of affordable housing to be delivered as part of what would 
otherwise be wholly commercial developments. In total this resulted in 44,000 new affordable 
homes - around half of the total of all affordable housing delivered in England in that financial 
year (Lord et al., 2020). However, delivering a substantial number of affordable dwellings in 
this way represents a very specific bargain between the local state, in the shape of planning 
control, and the development industry.  Evidence would suggest that this bargain is strongly 
influenced by site-specific debates on ‘development viability’, the strength of the market and 
the corresponding value available through the development available to be captured through 
LVC and returned in the form of affordable housing. In reflecting on this point Ferm and Raco 
(2020: 13) describe a “dependency on the market and private sector actors to deliver public 
benefit, and magnifies the already existing inequalities between places. Local authorities and 
citizens face a growing degree of dependence on lucrative development on viable sites with 
potential for land value uplift, in order to fund broader infrastructure and affordable housing 
elsewhere.”
This important finding provides the stimulus for further research on the geographic extent of 
this identified phenomenon and, critically, to quantify the relationship between market 
conditions, Land Value Capture practices and planning outcomes. In this paper we set out to 
investigate the relationship between these aspects of how real estate markets are animated in 
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two ways.  Firstly, we consider how local authorities in England choose to manage LVC in 
relation to house prices as a measure of development viability across all 326 local planning 
authorities in England.  We specifically seek to consider local authorities’ propensity to adopt 
a voluntary LVC mechanism, the Community Infrastructure Levy.  Secondly, we consider the 
degree to which variations in development viability might explain variations in outcome with 
regard to what has been secured through LVC policies in England.  In this respect we use 
development viability as the prism through which to view how contextually different local 
authorities secure LVC contributions of different types with a particular focus on direct 
payments versus affordable housing contributions secured through a parallel negotiated 
process.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the policy context, research 
design and data collection.  This is followed by an account of the difference-in-differences 
methodology we employ in the main analytical section of the paper before model results are 
presented and discussed. 
Policy context: Pass the parcel or the viability charade?
The concept that private development value should be subject to a charge or levy is a common 
feature of diverse socio-political contexts the world over (Gielen and van der Krabben, 2019). 
The origins of this public policy question can be found in the 19th century with what John Stuart 
Mill (1965) described as the ‘unearned increment’ and Henry George’s advocacy of the 
nationalisation of land rights through a single land tax (Buurman, 1986).  In modern times a 
range of practices can be identified with respect to how some or all of the uplift in land values 
resulting from the right to develop might be recovered (see for example, Whitehead, 2016).  
In England, the methods applied to this public policy question represent a hybrid approach. 
Firstly, LPA’s ability to negotiate obligatory contributions (hence ‘planning obligations’) with 
developers on a case-by-case basis is provided under section 106 of the 1990 Town and 
Country Planning Act - although the practice in effect goes back to the 1971 Town and Country 
Planning Act which enabled LPAs to enter into a contractual arrangement with developers. 
Since this time planning obligations have been agreed between developers and local authorities 
to make what would otherwise be unacceptable development permissible in planning terms 
(Jowell, 1977). Since the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, these obligations have 
typically been referred to as Section 106 obligations (S106), in reference to the clause in that 
Act that permits their use. By the 2000s S106 was being used to compensate third parties for 
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externalities and act as a de facto tax on the uplift in land values resulting from planning consent 
(Carindale, 2004). This led to calls to separate the two functions of direct mitigation and 
affordable housing, and a supplement to charge to meet wider infrastructure needs (Crook et 
al., 2006). S106 agreements are negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and as such are agreed 
through the planning application process, with agreements set out in a parallel document using 
contract law to bind both parties to the agreement. Since the 1990 Act case law has been used 
to define precedents of S106 regulations. 
Secondly, the Planning Act 2008 and subsequent regulations from 2010 (and amendments of 
2019) provide the legislative basis for the Community Infrastructure Levy (henceforth, CIL).  
This is a locally determined fixed charge on development which usually takes a relative form, 
such as ‘£X per square metre of new development’.  Following public consultation and 
independent examination, an adopting LPA must publish the levy rate in a CIL ‘charging 
schedule’ which then applies to most new development which creates net additional floor space 
of 100m2 or more.  Local planning authorities that have chosen to adopt CIL can operate these 
two approaches, CIL and S106, in parallel to manage land value capture.
Planning obligations and the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) in combination represent 
significant funding for social and environmental mitigation of development for local planning 
authorities (LPA). A study of the value and geographic incidence of developer contributions in 
England in 2018 showed that the aggregate value of these developer contributions was worth 
£6bn annually to local authorities in England (Lord et al., 2018).  This was followed by a 
subsequent study for the financial year 2018-19 that showed that the value of LVC exacted 
through these two instruments by English local authorities had grown to £7bn (Lord et al., 
2020).  However, S106 and CIL are distinct in concept, methodology and character - negotiated 
S106 agreements contrast with the published levy on development represented by CIL - and 
are consequently used to elicit different kinds of developer contribution.  CIL results in cash 
contributions made by the development industry to LPAs that can then be pooled over time to 
support direct statutory investment in infrastructure.  Perhaps the best example of this is the 
investment of CIL proceeds into Crossrail, a major east-west transit project in London 
(Planning Resource, 2016).  By contrast S106 results more usually in the delivery of in-kind 
benefits that are provided by the developer in the course of producing the development for 
which they have received planning consent. The consequence is that local planning authorities 
may choose to mix the two instruments in parallel to recover different types of developer 
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contribution: CIL to generate direct cash payments and S106 to secure in-kind contributions – 
such as affordable housing. 
For commercial developers providing new housing of this affordable variety is clearly in 
tension with the profit motive.  Without the option to use S106 to secure affordable housing of 
these types there would be no regulatory compulsion on developers to provide anything other 
than housing traded at market rates.  So, how does the development industry respond to the 
requirement that is sometimes placed upon them to deliver affordable housing?
Playing the viability charade
Beginning to answer this question is best accomplished by reference to behavioural insights 
into the process by which S106 agreements are negotiated and agreed. A programme of semi-
structured interviews conducted in parallel to the quantitative data collection reported later in 
this paper points to a clearly articulated understanding that CIL and S106 were considered in 
combination by developers. For example, one planning consultant described a trade-off:
 “what we want to do is get to a point where we can tell the council, ‘if you have 30% 
affordable housing they can get X developer contributions, but if they went for 20% 
affordable housing they could get more in developer contributions’. As part of that we 
will be looking at the scope for CIL, but that will be a question as to whether or not 
they want to have the maximum amount of affordable housing - because if they have 
that there will not be room for developer contributions.” (Case Study Interviewee, B3).
Testimony from LPAs in weaker markets repeatedly corroborated the analysis that CIL had 
diminished planners’ capacity to secure affordable housing through S106. Indeed, for some 
LPAs the decision to introduce CIL came with the explicit expectation that this would have to 
be compensated for with a reduced set of requests for other public goods through the parallel 
S106 system. One LPA officer in a weak housing market area said:
“106 was scaled back quite a lot. We used to seek obligations for transport, public 
realm, open space, sport, and community facilities etc. It was all through 106 
before…This has all gone since CIL.” (Case Study Interviewee, J1)
In other parts of the country the presence of CIL was understood as less of a deterrence to the 
use of S106. For example, testimony from an LPA officer in an area characterised by high 
house prices and strong development viability suggested that in such settings:  
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“CIL has had no impact on affordable housing whatsoever.” (Case Study Interviewee, 
Q1)
Indeed, in this particular case the authority had seen an aggregate growth in the value of 
developer contributions exacted since implementing CIL alongside S106: 
“CIL has increased our overall receipts from developer contributions as the smaller 
developers have to pay CIL and we have a lot of these small sites.” (Case Study 
Interviewee, Q1)
The implications of this small set of excerpts from a programme of 80 interviews conducted 
across 20 case studies from across England (for fuller qualitative evidence see Lord et al., 2020) 
points to the potential for the operation of two parallel systems, CIL and S106, to have a 
profound effect on the types of public goods that are being secured and the geography of their 
provision. In some areas interview testimony suggests that CIL is crowding out S106, which 
effectively means that LPAs are generating cash receipts through CIL at the expense of 
affordable housing units. By contrast, in other areas interviewees described a situation where 
CIL may co-exist with S106 and result in an increase in the overall level of investment secured 
which successfully funds both the delivery of new infrastructure and affordable housing.
These findings chime with much of the existing literature that seeks to understand the 
behavioural aspects of the negotiated process that underpins Section 106 agreements. In this 
regard some authors have pointed to the use of ‘viability assessments’ by developers in the 
negotiation process to argue that the inclusion of an affordable housing quota removes the 
prima facie business case for development (McAllister, 2017, 2019; McAllister, Shepherd and 
Wyatt, 2019).  This negotiation practice has come to be understood as one of the ways in which 
the development industry may seek to ‘game’ the negotiation process and can be found in 
reportage of the “viability charade” (Lord et al., 2019) and “pass the parcel”  (Crosby, 2019).  
Indeed, in this latter contribution (Crosby, 2019) dissects specific cases where the manner in 
which viability assessments have been computed and presented by developers has acted as a 
pretext to diminish the levels of affordable housing that have been delivered in practice.  A 
similar point is made by Wyatt (2017: 165) in seeking to identify the circumstances under 
which developers might use the argument of compromised scheme viability to diminish 
contributions of S106-funded affordable housing on the grounds that this in-kind contribution 
has been ‘crowded out’ by the presence of a cash payment through CIL: 
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“One of the key differences between CIL and planning obligations that was 
highlighted in the interviews was that CIL is a fixed levy and S106 is 
negotiable. This has led to concerns that, where scheme viability is an issue, 
there will be a reduction in planning obligations sought and, notably, a 
reduction in affordable housing provided”.
This raises the issue of the behavioural economics of the whole process.  If we proceed with 
the reasonable assumption that developers will favour those sites where development viability 
is most conspicuous and assemble a strategy accordingly we must also consider how local 
authorities might respond (Lord and Gu, 2019). Which authorities are most likely to adopt CIL? 
Where an authority has chosen to operate both CIL and S106 in parallel do the two instruments 
interact to change the mix of what is secured through developer contributions?  Is there a 
behavioural economic geography that means we can understand variations in outcome as a 
function of variations in market conditions?
To understand the interaction of S106 and CIL we present analysis using two data sets from 
two consecutive iterations of The incidence, value and delivery of planning obligations and 
community infrastructure levy in England (2016/17 and 2018/19).  These two projects were 
commissioned by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and were 
designed to provide intelligence on the value, geographic incidence and investment of 
contributions made by the development industry through S106 and CIL. The evidence 
presented here draws upon surveys distributed to every LPA in England in both 2017 and 2019 
(to harvest data for the financial years 2016/17 and 2018/19 respectively).  Full details of the 
surveys, including their reproduction, and case study interviews can be found in Lord et al., 
(2018; 2020). 
In the following sections we present an econometric analysis that combines the results of this 
primary survey data with an account of development viability, measured through a decile 
ranking of LPAs by house prices. Although it might be argued that house prices are not an 
exact corollary for ‘viability’ due to the site-specific nature of real estate development there is 
clear evidence that the central ingredient of development viability as a concept is the existence 
of a strong market, for which house prices are the most commonly employed general indicator.  
Indeed, much of the literature reinforces this point by acknowledging that general tendencies 
in house prices are locked in to the psychology of how we think about real estate (Murphy, 
2019) as well as being core to the development industry’s own assessments of future returns 
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and, therefore, development viability (for example, Colenutt, Cochrane and Field, 2015; 
Grayston, 2015). In the following analysis we explore three specific questions that pertain to 
the interaction of developer contributions policies vis a vis CIL and S106 in the context of 
geographically variable development viability. Firstly, do variations in development viability 
explain the geography of CIL adoption? Secondly, has the pattern of CIL adoption had a 
material effect on what has been secured through S106? Thirdly, what is the geographically 
differential effect on the overall level of developer contributions that have been exacted through 
the combination of CIL and 106?
Does development viability influence which local authorities might be expected to adopt 
CIL?
At the time of writing 50% (161 out of 326) of LPAs in England have adopted CIL.  To 
understand if the presence or absence of development viability influences local authorities’ 
decision making with regard to the adoption (or not) of CIL we can begin by classifying all 
326 LPAs in England into a decile rank using average house price per square metre (ONS, 
2017)1 as an indicator of development viability.  Each decile correspondingly includes 
approximately 33 LPAs. The number and the proportion of CIL charging LPAs are then 
counted alongside the breakdown of 10 decile bands as shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the 
propensity for LPAs to adopt CIL generally increases as the average dwelling price increases. 
The two extreme bands (1st and 10th deciles) show a significant discrepancy in the number of 
LPAs that chose to adopt CIL charging: only 9% of LPAs in 1st decile versus 88% of LPAs in 
the 10th decile have introduced CIL. 
Table 1 The average house price (£ per square metre) decile groups and the number and 
proportion of CIL charging LPAs in the deciles
Expressing the number of CIL charging LPAs in relation to development viability provides a 
useful perspective on the capacity for LPAs to charge CIL in different market conditions. From 
this observation we can hypothesise that LPAs in weaker markets have a generally weaker 
1 We use £/m2 data for all local authorities in England over the period 2010-2016.  The decision 
to confine the data to this period reflects the fact that data is not available beyond 2016 and, 
prior to 2010, includes the distorting effects of the global financial crash.
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propensity to adopt CIL, preferring to rely on the negotiated process of S106 agreements. 
Conversely, in stronger markets the presence of strong development viability provides a 
behavioural incentive for local authorities in such settings to combine CIL and S106 to 
potentially capture a greater proportion of the uplift associated with the award of planning 
consent.
To test this hypothesis, we employ a logistic model to provide an assessment of the likelihood 
of CIL adoption across all 326 LPAs distributed between the 10 house price deciles based on 
the cross-sectional data from 2018. The log-odds probability of CIL adoption is regressed on 
10 dummy variables corresponding to 10 house price deciles and a covariate “housing need” 
which uses the English Standard Method for the assessment of housing requirement (MHCLG, 
2019).  This measure provides an objective assessment of housing need that is applied 
uniformly throughout England to establish a forecast number of new dwellings to be produced 
in each local authority area.  In our analysis the Standard Method for the assessment of housing 
need provides a measure of development viability in that it effectively describes an assessment 
of the scale of new development required across England as a whole that is then spatially 
devolved to individual local authorities.
If the probability of CIL adoption is defined as  which takes a value of 1 if a LPA adopts CIL 𝑝
charging and 0 otherwise, the logistic model is formulated as:
𝒍𝒐𝒈
𝒑
𝟏 ― 𝒑 = 𝜶𝟏𝑫𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐𝑫𝟐 + … + 𝜶𝟎𝑫𝟏𝟎 + 𝜽 × 𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐬 + 𝛆 (1)
where  denotes the probability that an LPA adopts CIL divided by the probability that the 
𝑝
1 ― 𝑝
same LPA does not adopt CIL. Note that the coefficients  do not represent 𝛼1, 𝛼2,…, 𝛼10, 𝜃
probabilities of the corresponding parameters. 
The logistic regression results in a likelihood ratio chi-square of 68.2 with a p-value of 0.000 
indicating that the model is overall significant. The overall rate of correct classification is 
estimated to be 69.5% with 62.8% sensitivity (true positive rate) and 75.6% specificity (true 
negative rate), indicating that the use of house price deciles as a proxy for development viability 
can correctly classify 69.5% of local authorities in terms of their decision to adopt CIL or not. 
More importantly, the predicted probability of CIL adoption corresponding to each house price 
decile can be obtained from the marginal effect of each dummy variable on the probability of 
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CIL adoption. The predicted probabilities for the 10 house price deciles are illustrated in Figure 
1. This shows that the predicted probability of adopting CIL amongst LPAs in the 1st decile is 
as low as 12%. For those LPAs with house prices above the median (5th decile), the probability 
of CIL adoption increases to above 50% (except the 7th decile at 44%) and those authorities in 
the highest house price decile have an 82% probability of adopting CIL.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Does development viability explain variations in the character of developer 
contributions?
In the previous section the presence of development viability, as measured by average house 
prices, was found to be an important factor in explaining LPA’s decision whether or not to 
adopt CIL. LPAs with lower levels of development viability are less likely to adopt CIL, and 
hence the introduction of CIL in weak markets might lead to a three-way trade-off between 
CIL receipts, infrastructure investment and affordable housing funded through S106, and the 
economic viability of development. Continuing to use average house price as a proxy for 
development viability, this section seeks to detect the threshold where the trade-off between 
CIL and S106 occurs and with what geographic effects. We confine ourselves to S106-provided 
affordable housing as this is the most significant developer contribution that is exacted through 
this mechanism: Lord et al., (2020) show that of the £7bn aggregate total for developer 
contributions raised in England in 2018/19, £6bn (85%) was the result of S106 negotiations.  
The majority of these S106 contributions (£4.7bn, 78%) resulted in the 44,000 units of 
affordable housing contributions  delivered in that financial year. The definition of affordable 
housing that we employ includes the four main types of dwelling in this category in England:
 Affordable rent: housing rented to eligible households by local authorities or registered 
providers at a rent no more than 80% of market rent.
 Social rent: housing rented to eligible households by local authorities or registered 
providers at guideline rents determined by the Government. 
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 Affordable home ownership, intermediate rent and shared ownership: discounted sale 
or rent below market levels (but normally above social rents) to eligible households 
within income guidelines. 
 Starter Homes: dwellings for sale at 80% (or less) of market prices with restrictions on 
purchase to first time buyers with income restrictions.
To explore this question of how development viability influences the co-existence of CIL and 
S106-provided affordable housing we conduct a ‘quasi-experiment’ (Angrist and Pischke, 
2010) on the 326 LPAs using difference-in-differences (DID) approach to evaluate the effects 
of adopting CIL. The DID estimator describes the difference between the change in outcomes 
before and after a treatment is effected between treatment and control groups. To frame our 
question in a quasi-experiment, the number of S106 funded affordable housing units in an LPA 
is the ‘outcome’ variable of interest. The ‘treatment group’ is comprised of the 161 out of 326 
LPAs that had adopted CIL by the start of the financial year 2018/19.  The remaining LPAs in 
England that continued to operate just the pre-existing S106 system represent the ‘control 
group’. The ‘treatment’ is effected whenever a LPA adopts CIL which divides the before and 
after periods of CIL adoption as the pre- and post-treatment periods. Note that the earliest post-
treatment period started from 2011 (instead of the introduction year of CIL in 2008) as the first 
three LPAs to adopt CIL did so in 2011.
Using a standard two-group/two-period DID estimator, the estimated average treatment effect 
(ATE) of CIL adoption for outcome variable  can be expressed as: 𝑦







where  denotes the sample mean of the outcome variable. Assuming the rate of growth in the 𝑦
number of affordable housing units at any specific point in time is the same among CIL and 
non-CIL charging LPAs, any change in the growth rate of affordable housing for CIL charging 
LPAs is then attributed to the treatment effect of CIL adoption. Stated alternatively, we 
assumed that the rate of growth in affordable housing would have been maintained at the 
existing level in the absence of the treatment (the adoption of CIL). 
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Table 2 reports the sample means of S106-funded affordable housing units for the treatment 
and control groups at pre- and the post- adoption of CIL. The individual level statistics for all 
the LPAs are presented in Panel A and the group level statistics in terms of the LPAs in 10 
house price deciles are in Panel B. Among all the CIL charging LPAs (in Panel A), the 
difference in the mean number of affordable housing units between the pre- and the post- CIL 
adoption is 38.3 units (given by 54.6 minus 16.3 units) compared to 24.1 units for the non-CIL 
charging LPAs. Therefore, by assuming the same rate of growth in affordable housing across 
all LPAs, the adoption of CIL is found to yield an overall positive impact on the change in 
S106 funded affordable housing units. 
However, it could be argued that this assumption of an identical growth rate in affordable 
housing across all LPAs is unrealistic as different LPAs will respond to their own local 
circumstances and should have locally bespoke affordable housing targets. Given that the 
previous section demonstrated house prices to be an effective proxy for development viability 
in estimating the propensity for LPA’s to adopt CIL, we can further categorise all 326 LPAs 
into 10 bands of development viability. The group level mean values of affordable housing 
variations across different development vitality groups is set out in Panel B of Table 2. A clear 
pattern is observable: CIL charging LPAs with low levels of development viability (house 
prices below £1,200 m2) have experienced a negative 0.5 unit change in affordable housing 
compared to an increase of 13.4 units of affordable housing for the non-CIL charging LPAs 
given the same house price condition. The same negative impact of CIL adoption can also be 
observed by LPAs in the 2nd and 3rd house price deciles. For stronger housing markets above 
the median (the 5th decile), the rates of change in affordable housing across pre- and post- CIL 
adoption periods were able to be maintained and some even observed an increase in quantity 
of S106-provided affordable housing that had been secured (e.g. 6th and 7th deciles). 
[Insert Table 2 here]
This simple comparison of sample means provides an insight into the overall impact of CIL 
and a pattern of how development viability influences what LPAs are able to secure through 
LVC. Beyond the treatment effect from sample mean, the rate of growth over time in affordable 
housing may involve many other factors other than the adoption of CIL that affects affordable 
housing outcomes. For example, time-specific factors (e.g. national policies on housing 
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delivery) and individual-specific factors (e.g. local housing needs assessments) could vary the 
rate of growth in affordable housing locally. To address these issues a regression model can be 
designed. A difference-in-differences (DID) model with fixed effect is formulated as:
𝒚𝒊𝒈𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏,𝒕 + 𝛄𝟏 × 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲𝒊𝒕 × 𝑫𝟏,𝒊 + … + 𝛄𝟏𝟎 × 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲𝒊𝒕 × 𝑫𝟏𝟎,𝒊 + 𝒙′𝒊𝒕𝝓 + 𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒕
(3
)
where  denotes the S106 affordable housing units of LPA  in house price decile  at time 𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑡 𝑖 𝑔
period , the vectors  and  capture respectively the individual fixed effect for LPA  and 𝑡 𝛽0,𝑖 𝛽1,𝑡 𝑖
the time-specific fixed effect at time . The dummy variable  equals 1 if LPA  adopts 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑖
CIL charging and is at the post-treatment period, and the list of dummy variables  𝐷1,𝑖,…,𝐷10,𝑖
takes value of 1 if LPA  is in house price decile . Lastly the variables  is a vector of control 𝑖 𝑔 𝑥𝑖𝑡
variables capture the potential variations of affordable housing unrelated to policy impact and 
in this model we use housing needs as a control covariate. The group-specific treatment effects 
of CIL across the 10 house price deciles are explained by the interaction terms of  and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡
.𝐷𝑔
The estimation result of the DID model is reported in Table 3. We also estimate a benchmark 
result in the absence of group-specific treatment effects for comparison which is presented in 
Model [1]. The heterogenous group-specific treatment effects of CIL across house price deciles 
are estimated in Model [2]. The average treatment effect in Model [1] shows that, CIL charging 
LPAs on average were able to secure 6 more units of S106-funded affordable housing after 
adopting CIL. However, this obscures the evidence that there is variation amongst CIL 
charging authorities dependent upon the level of development viability present as measured by 
average house prices. The result in Model [2] provides a detailed breakdown of the impact of 
CIL on affordable housing across all 10 groups of LPAs by the level of development viability 
present in the local authority areas (as measured by average house prices). After adopting CIL 
LPAs in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th house price deciles experienced a decrease in S106 funded 
affordable housing (respectively by 34, 14, 11, 4 units). In contrast for LPAs in the 5th decile 
and higher, adopting CIL could secure up to 21 units more in S106-funded affordable housing. 
To visualise the heterogenous impact clearly, Figure 2 plots the coefficients of estimated 
treatment effects of CIL on S106 affordable housing by 10 deciles of house price (£ per square 
metre).  The LPAs belonging to each group are listed beneath the horizonal axis. According to 
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the plot, the treatment effect of CIL adoption exhibits an increasing but nonlinear pattern from 
the weakest and the strongest housing markets. Under the combined developer contribution 
system the point at which the effect of CIL on S106 funded affordable housing becomes neutral 
and then positive is between 4th and 5th deciles of the average house price distribution. The 
average house price of £1,800 per square metre is the threshold at which this trade-off takes 
place. For LPAs with house prices below £1,800 per m2, affordable housing units through S106 
have been crowded out by CIL; beyond this value CIL can be understood as providing 
supplementary cash contributions alongside S106-funded affordable housing.
[Inset Table 3 here]
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The findings of Table 3 are very clear. For those authorities in decile 4 and below the choice 
to implement CIL should come with the expectation that it may diminish the amount of 
affordable housing that could be secured through S106.  In these LPAs the levels of 
development viability are not sufficiently strong to support the co-existence of CIL and S106 
- mandatory cash receipts generated through CIL could be ‘crowding out’ what can be achieved 
through S106.  However, for LPAs in decile 6 and higher CIL can be understood as an 
important instrument for supplementing what can be achieved through S106.  Amongst these 
local authorities CIL is not a stimulus to affordable housing provision but, rather, rates of 
affordable housing secured through S106 can be understood as stable or even able to grow 
alongside a mandatory CIL charge on development. Crucially the variable that explains LPA’s 
capacity to implement CIL alongside S106 is the level of existing development viability.  On 
this analysis for any authority with strong development viability it could be sensible to adopt 
CIL as it would provide an additional instrument to manage LVC that will not come at the 
expense of the S106 contributions for affordable housing.  
These observations raise three related further questions.  Firstly, to what extent does the 
availability of CIL mean that LPAs with strong development viability are able to use this in 
addition to S106 to secure more than they did prior to their adoption of CIL?  Secondly, for 
those CIL-adopting LPAs that have lower levels of development viability, has CIL had any 
effect on the mix of developer contributions that have been exacted (in favour of cash 
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contributions through CIL and away from affordable housing through S106)? Has it had a 
material effect on the overall value of what has been secured?
Does development viability affect the amount of value LPAs are able to capture? 
In this section we use the data from the two surveys of local authorities for the financial years 
2016/17 and 2018/19 to consider the effect of CIL adoption on the absolute value of developer 
contributions secured for local authorities. Considering the value of S106 planning obligations 
and Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) secured by English LPAs we estimate the average 
value of agreed developer contributions per LPA. The estimation method is based on the 
methodology employed in Lord et al. (2018, 2020) which uses assumptions and secondary 
sources (e.g. average house price, CIL adoption schedule) in order to scale individual level 
survey responses to provide regional, national and groups level (using the LPA family typology 
devised by Vickers et al., 2003) analyses. The estimated total value of developer contributions 
is then grouped by variation in house price (£ per square metre) quantiles2 and CIL/non-CIL 
adoption. The average value of developer contributions per CIL and non-CIL LPA can then be 
calculated by dividing the total value by the number of CIL and non-CIL LPAs within each 
house price quantile. The comparison of the average value of developer contributions for 
2016/17 and 2018/19 is presented in Table 4. The regional distribution of LPAs in each house 
price quantile is also summarised in Table 5 to assist with geographic comparison.
The overall result shows that, making CIL available to LPAs in stronger housing markets 
especially the top quantile can increase the average amount of LVC secured. For instance in 
2016/17, LPAs with average house prices above £3,000 m2, recorded an average value of total 
developer contributions through CIL and S106 of £32.3 million per LPA for authorities that 
had adopted CIL versus £15.1 million for non-CIL adopting LPAs. A similar result emerges 
from the 2018/19 dataset for LPAs with average house prices above £3000 m2 (£29.9m for CIL 
and £13m for non-CIL LPAs). 
The average figures in the 4th quantile could be distorted by the fact that this includes London 
LPAs that have an additional form of LVC applied to development in the form of ‘Mayoral 
CIL’ that is exacted by the Mayor of London and does not apply outside London. Still, the 
findings are robust by excluding the contributions of London LPAs in the 4th house price 
2 This analysis groups the 326 English LPAs into 4 house price quantiles rather than deciles as in the previous analysis in this paper. Breaking 
the distribution down into quantiles allows us to scale up the sub-sample and increase the statistical significance for the estimates. 
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quantile with the result that CIL adopting authorities in this quantile secured £9.8m, whilst non-
CIL adopting authorities were able to capture £5.4m in 2016/17.  Applying the same method 
for the top quantile (excluding London authorities) for 2018/19 produces similar results: CIL 
adopting authorities secured £12.9m whilst non CIL-adopting authorities captured less than 
half this sum, £6.2m. 
The difference between CIL and non-CIL LPAs in the average value of total exactions secured 
is less obvious across the 1st to 3nd house price quantiles. For example, in 2016/17, non-CIL 
adopting LPAs in quantiles 2 and 3 on average secured larger exactions than equivalent CIL 
charging LPAs, whilst, CIL charging LPAs in quantile 1 secured larger exactions than the non-
CIL LPAs.  By 2018/19, the non-CIL LPAs in quantiles 1 and 2 recorded larger exactions than 
the CIL charging LPAs. However, non-CIL adopting LPAs in quantile 3 secured less than CIL 
charging LPAs.  This mixed portrait potentially reflects the adoption of CIL by authorities 
between 2016/17 and 2018/19.  As adopting authorities will have made the self-assessment that 
CIL represented a viable charge on development this might explain why CIL authorities in 
quantiles 2 and 3 performed relatively better in comparison to non-CIL adopting authorities in 
2018/19 than in 2016/17.
With respect to a comparison of the agreed value of S106 affordable housing between CIL and 
non-CIL charging authorities, there is evidence of a trade-off effect between CIL and S106-
funded affordable housing in relation to house prices. The CIL charging LPAs from the 1st to 
3rd house price quantiles on average secured less affordable housing than the non-CIL charging 
LPAs in 2016/17.  The same finding can be observed with respect to the 1st and 2nd quantiles 
in 2018/19.  To illustrate, the implications of the decision to adopt CIL or not we can consider 
a counterfactual analysis using the results in Table 4.  A non-CIL charging LPA from the 1st 
quantile was able, on average, to secure £3.1m in S106 affordable housing contributions in 
2016/17.  If the same authority adopted CIL subsequently it would be expected to secure £1.5m 
in affordable housing contributions in 2018/19.  However, the LPA would have been able to 
exact £5m from affordable housing if it had remained as a non CIL-adopting LPA. The findings 
for LPAs in the 2nd house price quantile obey the same pattern. Yet, for those in quantiles 3 
and 4, the scenario is reversed. For example, a non-CIL charging LPA from the 3rd quantile 
secured £7.8m in S106-funded affordable housing contributions in 2016/17.  If the same LPA 
subsequently adopted CIL it would be expected to secure £8.1m in S106 affordable housing in 
2018/19, whereas it would only have been able to exact £6.1m in the event that it had remained 
a non-CIL charging authority. 
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This counterfactual analysis indicates that there may be a trade-off effect between CIL and in-
kind contributions resulting through S106 in CIL adopting authorities where markets are 
weaker. Such authorities are primarily located in the North West, North East, East Midlands, 
West Midlands and Yorkshire and The Humber (see Table 5 for the distribution of house price 
quantiles by region). By contrast adopting CIL in LPAs where development viability is stronger 
may make it possible for LPAs to recover more land value uplift through the use of CIL and 
S106 in parallel. This may be the effect that is revealed in the analysis presented in this paper 
that is observable in the South East and London.
[Insert Table 4 here]
[Insert Table 5 here]
Conclusion
The principal conclusion of this paper is that there is a strong geographic variation in how 
CIL and S106 interact. At one extreme, in some areas the existence of CIL has provided an 
additional mechanism by which LVC can be exacted. The adoption of CIL within local 
authorities with the greatest development viability has not diminished the level of affordable 
housing that could concomitantly be secured through S106.  This may reflect an increased 
potential to secure a greater proportion of the uplift in land values resulting from planning 
consent in some parts of England. However, this is conjecture and points to the requirement 
for further research on the degree to which different approaches to LVC secure relatively 
more or less of the change in land value attributable to the right to develop. 
In other parts of England the situation is very different. LPAs in weaker markets may 
experience a negative impact on their capacity to use S106 to capture increased land values as 
a result of adopting CIL.  In our analysis this is reflected in a diminished capacity to secure 
S106-funded affordable housing.  The large size and diverse nature of market conditions in 
English local authorities means that many, even in decile 1 of the house price distribution, 
have issues of housing unaffordability in some areas.  
The resulting conclusion is that a local authority’s decision regarding whether or not to adopt 
CIL can have an effect on LVC outcomes and would ideally be guided by the analysis 
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contained in this paper.  Local authorities with strong development viability may well be 
sensible to adopt CIL as it represents an LVC instrument that can generate cash receipts 
supplementary to in kind contributions through S106.  
A final point on which further research may be required is the degree to which the market 
variations between LPAs illustrated by our results actually describes a capacity to bargain. 
Given that S106 contributions are negotiated it must be acknowledged that there is a clear 
behavioural aspect to how affordable housing contributions are negotiated that may be 
correlated with prevailing market conditions. LPAs in the strongest markets may be able to 
maintain (and grow) the levels of affordable housing secured through S106 in combination 
with CIL as they are bargaining from a position of strength relative to local authorities that 
have generally lower levels of development viability. Conversely, LPAs in weaker markets 
may see CIL more readily crowd out S106-secured affordable housing as their capacity to 
negotiate is weak to begin with and weakened further by the presence of CIL. The findings 
reported in this paper, together with those of cognate research (Dunning et al., 2019), point to 
the need for further work on the behavioural aspects of the relationship between LVC 
processes and built environment outcomes. 
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Table 1. The average house price (£ per square metre) decile groups and the number and 
proportion of CIL charging LPAs in the deciles
Decile House price per square metre (round 
to £100)
Number of CIL 
charging LPAs
% of CIL charging
1 Below £1200 3 9%
2 £1200-1400 10 31%
3 £1401-1600 13 39%
4 £1601-1800 11 34%
5 £1801-2000 16 48%
6 £2001-2300 21 64%
7 £2301-2600 15 48%
8 £2601-3200 24 73%
9 3201-4000 19 59%
10 £4001-17100 29 88%
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Table 2. Sample mean of affordable housing units through Section 106 (nil grant) of the CIL 





Year 2000 - 2010 2011 - 2018 2000 - 2010 2011 - 2018
Panel A: Individual level mean
All LPAs 16.3 54.6 10.7 34.8
Panel B: Group level mean by house price (£ per sq.m.) decile
Decile 1 (Below 1,200) 14.5 14.0 3.2 16.6
Decile 2 (1,200-1,400) 10.8 24.9 10.7 31.5
Decile 3 (1,401-1,600) 21.4 36.3 14.1 36.7
Decile 4 (1,601-1,800) 32.7 68.0 14.6 33.3
Decile 5 (1,801-2,000) 17.1 50.9 9.2 28.5
Decile 6 (2,001-2,300) 15.3 77.3 22.7 44.6
Decile 7 (2,301-2,600) 14.1 66.6 10.7 47.0
Decile 8 (2,601-3,200) 8.1 55.1 8.3 67.9
Decile 9 (3,201-4,000) 12.8 46.9 7.5 31.9
Decile 10 (Above 4,000) 20.6 58.9 12.3 61.3
Page 23 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
Table 3. Estimation of the CIL treatment effect by high-low house price
Dependent variable S106 funded affordable housing units
Model [1] Model [2]























Control variable (housing needs) Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects (326 LPAs) Yes Yes
Time fixed effects (2001-2018) Yes Yes
Number of observations 5544 5544




1) Numbers in brackets are the p-value of the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
2) Since the affordable housing data is recorded at completion, we use 1-year lagged 
treatment variable to proxy the contemporaneous treatment impact.
3) The estimation has excluded 5 local authorities (Barrow-in-Furness, Halton, Isles of 
Scilly, Knowsley, Tameside) because they lack for S106 funded affordable housing 
data.
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Table 4. Average value of agreed planning obligations per CIL and non-CIL charging LPA by 





















Panel A: Financial year 2016/17
Quantile 1
 (Below 1500)
4.5 - 2.0 3.1 0.2 0.5 6.7 3.6
Quantile 2
 (1500-2000)
3.0 - 1.2 8.4 1.4 1.2 5.6 9.6
Quantile 3
 (2000-3000)
3.6 - 4.5 7.8 0.4 2.3 8.5 10.0
Quantile 4
 (above 3000)
13.2 - 14.0 11.4 5.1 3.7 32.3 15.1
Quantile 4***
 (above 3000)
3.0 - 5.2 4.2 1.6 1.2 9.8 5.4
Panel B: Financial year 2018/19
Quantile 1
 (Below 1500)
2.0 - 1.5 5.0 0.5 2.6 4.0 7.6
Quantile 2 
(1500-2000)
2.5 - 3.8 7.5 1.5 2.4 7.8 9.9
Quantile 3
 (2000-3000)
2.8 - 8.1 6.1 0.7 3.2 11.7 9.3
Quantile 4
 (above 3000)
12.7 - 15.3 10.2 1.9 2.8 29.9 13.0
Quantile 4**
 (above 3000)
4.8 - 7.2 4.8 0.9 1.4 12.9 6.2
Source: LPA Survey 2016/17 and 2018/19, MHCLG reports 2016/17 and 2018/19, Local 
Authority Housing Statistics, ONS house price data. * The value reported for 2016/17 has 
adjusted for inflation to reflect the real terms in 2018/19. ** The non-affordable housing 
planning obligations include open space & environment, transport & travel, community 
works, education and other obligations. *** The value of agreed planning obligations 
reported in this row excludes the results from London LPAs. 
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Table 5.  Percentage of LPAs by region in each house price quantile, 2018/19
Quantile
Region 1 2 3 4
East Midlands 25% 20% 4% 0%
East of England 4% 15% 23% 16%
London 0% 0% 0% 41%
North East 12% 2% 0% 0%
North West 33% 14% 1% 0%
South East 0% 6% 35% 42%
South West 1% 17% 26% 1%
West Midlands 11% 17% 9% 0%
Yorkshire and The Humber 14% 9% 2% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100%





























Average house price deciles
95% confidence interval Probability to introduce CIL
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of CIL adoption for the house price deciles
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Ashfield Allerdale Amber Valley Blaby Broadland Ashford Arun Adur Brentwood Barnet
Barnsley Bolton Birmingham Breckland Cheshire East Babergh Basildon Aylesbury Vale Brighton and Hove Brent
Barrow-in-Furness Bradford Broxtowe Charnwood Cornwall Bedford Braintree Barking and Dagenham Bromley Cambridge
Bassetlaw Bury Cannock Chase Cheshire West and Chester Daventry Bromsgrove Bristol Basingstoke and Deane Broxbourne Camden
Blackburn with Darwen Calderdale Chorley Craven Derbyshire Dales Colchester Canterbury Bath and North East SomersetChiltern City of London
Blackpool Chesterfield Coventry East Northamptonshire Dover East Cambridgeshire Castle Point Bexley Croydon Ealing
Bolsover Corby Dudley Forest of Dean Forest Heath Folkestone and Hythe Central Bedfordshire Bournemouth Dacorum Elmbridge
Boston Derby East Riding of Yorkshire Fylde Gosport Harrogate Cheltenham Bracknell Forest East Hertfordshire Epsom and Ewell
Burnley East Lindsey East Staffordshire Gloucester Hambleton Lichfield Cherwell Chelmsford Enfield Greenwich
Carlisle Erewash Eden High Peak Harborough Luton Cotswold Chichester Epping Forest Hackney
Copeland Fenland Gedling Hinckley and Bosworth Hastings Malvern Hills East Devon Christchurch Guildford Hammersmith and Fulham
Darlington Gateshead Great Yarmouth Ipswich Herefordshire Medway Eastbourne Crawley Hart Haringey
Doncaster Halton Kettering King's Lynn & West Norfolk Huntingdonshire Mendip Eastleigh Dartford Newham Harrow
Durham Kirklees Lancaster Leeds Isle of Wight Milton Keynes Exeter East Dorset Oxford Hertsmere
Hartlepool Lincoln Leicester Manchester Mid Devon North Dorset Fareham East Hampshire Redbridge Hillingdon
Hull Newark and Sherwood Newcastle Upon Tyne Melton Mid Suffolk North Somerset Gravesham Havering Reigate and Banstead Hounslow
Hyndburn Newcastle-Under-Lyme North East Derbyshire North Warwickshire North Devon Portsmouth Harlow Horsham Runnymede Islington
Isles of Scilly Northumberland North Kesteven Northampton North Norfolk Rushcliffe Havant Lewes Sevenoaks Kensington and Chelsea
Knowsley Nottingham North Tyneside Oadby and Wigston Norwich Rutland Maidstone Mid Sussex Slough Kingston upon Thames
Liverpool Preston North West Leicestershire Plymouth South Lakeland Solihull Maldon New Forest South Oxfordshire Lambeth
Mansfield Sandwell Nuneaton and Bedworth Redditch South Norfolk South Gloucestershire Rochford North Hertfordshire Spelthorne Lewisham
Middlesbrough Sefton Peterborough Ribble Valley South Somerset South Northamptonshire Rother Poole Surrey Heath Merton
North East Lincolnshire South Holland Salford Richmondshire South Staffordshire Southampton South Hams Purbeck Sutton Mole Valley
North Lincolnshire South Tyneside Scarborough Rugby Stockport St Edmundsbury Southend-on-Sea Reading Tandridge Richmond upon Thames
Oldham Stockton-on-Tees Sheffield Ryedale Swindon Stroud Stevenage Rushmoor Tunbridge Wells South Bucks
Pendle Tameside South Derbyshire Sedgemoor Taunton Deane Suffolk Coastal Stratford-on-Avon South Cambridgeshire Watford Southwark
Redcar and Cleveland Telford and Wrekin South Kesteven Selby Tendring Swale Test Valley Tonbridge and Malling Waverley St Albans
Rochdale Wakefield South Ribble Shropshire Thanet Teignbridge Thurrock Uttlesford Welwyn Hatfield Three Rivers
Rossendale Walsall Staffordshire Moorlands Stafford Torbay Tewkesbury Warwick Vale of White Horse Winchester Tower Hamlets
Rotherham West Lindsey Waveney Tamworth Torridge Trafford West Dorset Wealden Woking Waltham Forest
St Helens Wirral Wellingborough Warrington West Devon Weymouth and Portland York West Berkshire Wokingham Wandsworth
Stoke-on-Trent Wolverhampton West Lancashire Wyre Forest West Somerset Wiltshire West Oxfordshire Wycombe Westminster































Average price per square metre (£)
Figure 2. Estimated treatment effect coefficients of CIL on S106 affordable housing, by deciles of average house price (£ per square metre) and 
the list of LPAs in each decile group (the CIL-charging LPAs are in bold text).
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